Tatsuya Sasaki
Tatsuya Sasaki
Risk Management, F-Power inc.
確認したメール アドレス: f-power.co.jp - ホームページ
タイトル
引用先
引用先
The take-it-or-leave-it option allows small penalties to overcome social dilemmas
T Sasaki, Å Brännström, U Dieckmann, K Sigmund
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 109 (4), 1165-1169, 2012
1032012
The evolution of cooperation by social exclusion
T Sasaki, S Uchida
Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 280 (1752), 20122498, 2013
802013
First carrot, then stick: how the adaptive hybridization of incentives promotes cooperation
X Chen*, T Sasaki*, Å Brännström, U Dieckmann, [*joint first author]
Journal of The Royal Society Interface 12 (102), 20140935, 2015
752015
Evolution of public cooperation in a monitored society with implicated punishment and within-group enforcement
X Chen, T Sasaki, P Matjaz
Scientific Reports 5, 17050, 2015
552015
Replicator dynamics in public goods games with reward funds
T Sasaki, T Unemi
Journal of Theoretical Biology 287, 109-114, 2011
542011
Probabilistic participation in public goods games
T Sasaki, I Okada, T Unemi
Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 274 (1625), 2639-2642, 2007
522007
Rewards and the evolution of cooperation in public good games
T Sasaki, S Uchida
Biology Letters 10 (1), 20130903, 2014
482014
Voluntary rewards mediate the evolution of pool punishment for maintaining public goods in large populations
T Sasaki, S Uchida, X Chen
Scientific Reports 5, 2015
342015
Commitment to Cooperation and Peer Punishment: Its Evolution
T Sasaki, I Okada, S Uchida, X Chen
Games 6 (4), 574-587, 2015
262015
The Effect of Incentives and Meta-incentives on the Evolution of Cooperation
I Okada, H Yamamoto, F Toriumi, T Sasaki
PLoS Computational Biology 11 (5), e1004232, 2015
262015
The evolution of conditional moral assessment in indirect reciprocity
T Sasaki, I Okada, Y Nakai
Scientific Reports 7, 41870, 2017
242017
Effect of assessment error and private information on stern-judging in indirect reciprocity
S Uchida, T Sasaki
Chaos, Solitons & Fractals 56, 175-180, 2013
232013
The Evolution of Reputation-based Cooperation in Regular Networks
T Sasaki, H Yamamoto, I Okada, S Uchida
Games 8 (1), 8, 2017
152017
Tolerant indirect reciprocity can boost social welfare through solidarity with unconditional cooperators in private monitoring
I Okada, T Sasaki, Y Nakai
Scientific Reports 7, 9737, 2017
142017
A norm knockout method on indirect reciprocity to reveal indispensable norms
H Yamamoto, I Okada, S Uchida, T Sasaki
Scientific Reports 7, 44146, 2017
142017
Indirect reciprocity can overcome free-rider problems on costly moral assessment
T Sasaki, I Okada, Y Nakai
Biology Letters 12, 20160341, 2016
142016
Cheating is evolutionarily assimilated with cooperation in the continuous snowdrift game
T Sasaki, I Okada
BioSystems 131, 51–59, 2015
142015
The evolution of cooperation through institutional incentives and optional participation
T Sasaki
Dynamic Games and Applications 4 (3), 345-362, 2014
122014
A theoretical approach to norm ecosystems: two adaptive architectures of indirect reciprocity show different paths to the evolution of cooperation
S Uchida, H Yamamoto, I Okada, T Sasaki
Frontiers in Physics 6, 14, 2018
92018
A solution for private assessment in indirect reciprocity using solitary observation
I Okada, T Sasaki, Y Nakai
Journal of Theoretical Biology 455, 7-15, 2018
82018
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