| Incentives and stability in large two-sided matching markets F Kojima, PA Pathak American Economic Review 99 (3), 608-627, 2009 | 488 | 2009 |
| Designing random allocation mechanisms: Theory and applications E Budish, YK Che, F Kojima, P Milgrom American economic review 103 (2), 585-623, 2013 | 425 | 2013 |
| Efficient matching under distributional constraints: Theory and applications Y Kamada, F Kojima American Economic Review 105 (1), 67-99, 2015 | 317* | 2015 |
| School choice: Impossibilities for affirmative action F Kojima Games and Economic Behavior 75 (2), 685-693, 2012 | 275 | 2012 |
| Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts JW Hatfield, F Kojima Journal of Economic theory 145 (5), 1704-1723, 2010 | 268 | 2010 |
| Matching with couples: Stability and incentives in large markets F Kojima, PA Pathak, AE Roth The Quarterly Journal of Economics 128 (4), 1585-1632, 2013 | 249 | 2013 |
| Asymptotic equivalence of probabilistic serial and random priority mechanisms YK Che, F Kojima Econometrica 78 (5), 1625-1672, 2010 | 237* | 2010 |
| Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism F Kojima, M Manea Journal of Economic Theory 145 (1), 106-123, 2010 | 202 | 2010 |
| Axioms for deferred acceptance F Kojima, M Manea Econometrica 78 (2), 633-653, 2010 | 171 | 2010 |
| Matching with contracts: Comment JW Hatfield, F Kojima American Economic Review 98 (3), 1189-1194, 2008 | 163 | 2008 |
| Random assignment of multiple indivisible objects F Kojima Mathematical Social Sciences 57 (1), 134-142, 2009 | 140 | 2009 |
| Stable matching in large economies YK Che, J Kim, F Kojima Econometrica 87 (1), 65-110, 2019 | 129 | 2019 |
| The “Boston” school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach F Kojima, MU Ünver Economic Theory 55, 515-544, 2014 | 109 | 2014 |
| Group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts JW Hatfield, F Kojima Games and Economic Behavior 67 (2), 745-749, 2009 | 109 | 2009 |
| Stability concepts in matching under distributional constraints Y Kamada, F Kojima Journal of Economic theory 168, 107-142, 2017 | 106 | 2017 |
| Designing matching mechanisms under general distributional constraints M Goto, F Kojima, R Kurata, A Tamura, M Yokoo Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation …, 2015 | 87 | 2015 |
| Stability and strategy‐proofness for matching with constraints: A necessary and sufficient condition Y Kamada, F Kojima Theoretical Economics 13 (2), 761-793, 2018 | 83 | 2018 |
| Random paths to pairwise stability in many-to-many matching problems: a study on market equilibration F Kojima, MU Ünver International Journal of Game Theory 36, 473-488, 2008 | 81 | 2008 |
| Designing matching mechanisms under constraints: An approach from discrete convex analysis F Kojima, A Tamura, M Yokoo Journal of Economic Theory 176, 803-833, 2018 | 80 | 2018 |
| Voter preferences, polarization, and electoral policies Y Kamada, F Kojima American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 6 (4), 203-236, 2014 | 79 | 2014 |
Yuichiro KamadaAssociate Professor of Marketing, University of California, BerkeleyVerified email at haas.berkeley.edu
