Tail‐dependence in stock‐return pairs I Fortin, C Kuzmics Intelligent Systems in Accounting, Finance & Management 11 (2), 89-107, 2002 | 120 | 2002 |
Representative consumer's risk aversion and efficient risk-sharing rules C Hara, J Huang, C Kuzmics Journal of Economic Theory 137 (1), 652-672, 2007 | 88* | 2007 |
Abraham Wald's complete class theorem and Knightian uncertainty C Kuzmics Games and Economic Behavior 104, 666-673, 2017 | 56* | 2017 |
Hidden symmetries and focal points C Alós-Ferrer, C Kuzmics Journal of Economic Theory 148 (1), 226-258, 2013 | 52 | 2013 |
Symmetric play in repeated allocation games C Kuzmics, T Palfrey, BW Rogers Journal of Economic Theory 154, 25-67, 2014 | 38 | 2014 |
Refined best reply correspondence and dynamics D Balkenborg, J Hofbauer, C Kuzmics Theoretical Economics 8 (1), 165-192, 2013 | 36 | 2013 |
Evolutionary stability of discrimination under observability F Herold, C Kuzmics Games and Economic Behavior 67 (2), 542-551, 2009 | 36* | 2009 |
On public good provision mechanisms with dominant strategies and balanced budget C Kuzmics, JH Steg Journal of Economic Theory 170, 56-69, 2017 | 26 | 2017 |
Effects of background risks on cautiousness with an application to a portfolio choice problem C Hara, J Huang, C Kuzmics Journal of Economic Theory 146 (1), 346-358, 2011 | 25* | 2011 |
Stochastic evolutionary stability in extensive form games of perfect information C Kuzmics Games and Economic Behavior 48 (2), 321-336, 2004 | 24* | 2004 |
The refined best-response correspondence in normal form games D Balkenborg, J Hofbauer, C Kuzmics International Journal of Game Theory 44, 165-193, 2015 | 18* | 2015 |
Pre-election polls as strategic coordination devices C Andonie, C Kuzmics Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 84 (2), 681-700, 2012 | 15 | 2012 |
On the elimination of dominated strategies in stochastic models of evolution with large populations C Kuzmics Games and Economic Behavior 72 (2), 452-466, 2011 | 15 | 2011 |
The evolution of taking roles F Herold, C Kuzmics Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 174, 38-63, 2020 | 11 | 2020 |
Individual and group selection in symmetric 2-player games C Kuzmics Mimeo, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, 2003 | 9 | 2003 |
The (non-) robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria when the sender’s preferences are state independent C Diehl, C Kuzmics International Journal of Game Theory 50 (4), 911-925, 2021 | 8 | 2021 |
An incomplete information justification of symmetric equilibrium in symmetric games C Kuzmics, BW Rogers Available at SSRN 1712102, 2010 | 7 | 2010 |
Limit Orders and Knightian Uncertainty M Greinecker, C Kuzmics arXiv preprint arXiv:2208.10804, 2022 | 5 | 2022 |
A comment on “Egalitarianism and efficiency in repeated symmetric games” by V. Bhaskar [Games Econ. Behav. 32 (2000) 247–262] C Kuzmics, B Rogers Games and Economic Behavior 74 (1), 240-242, 2012 | 5 | 2012 |
Is ellsberg behavior evidence of ambiguity aversion? C Kuzmics, B Rogers, X Zhang Available at SSRN 3437331, 2020 | 4 | 2020 |