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Yuichiro Kamada
Yuichiro Kamada
Associate Professor of Marketing, University of California, Berkeley
Verified email at haas.berkeley.edu - Homepage
Title
Cited by
Cited by
Year
Efficient matching under distributional constraints: Theory and applications
Y Kamada, F Kojima
American Economic Review 105 (1), 67-99, 2015
325*2015
Hierarchical cheap talk
A Ambrus, EM Azevedo, Y Kamada
Theoretical Economics 8 (1), 233-261, 2013
1292013
Stability concepts in matching under distributional constraints
Y Kamada, F Kojima
Journal of Economic theory 168, 107-142, 2017
1082017
Stability and strategy‐proofness for matching with constraints: A necessary and sufficient condition
Y Kamada, F Kojima
Theoretical Economics 13 (2), 761-793, 2018
105*2018
Revision games
Y Kamada, M Kandori
Econometrica 88 (4), 1599-1630, 2020
90*2020
Voter preferences, polarization, and electoral policies
Y Kamada, F Kojima
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 6 (4), 203-236, 2014
792014
Fair matching under constraints: Theory and applications
Y Kamada, F Kojima
Review of Economic Studies 91 (2), 1162-1199, 2024
702024
Social distance and network structures
R Iijima, Y Kamada
Theoretical Economics 12 (2), 655-689, 2017
632017
Asynchronicity and coordination in common and opposing interest games
R Calcagno, Y Kamada, S Lovo, T Sugaya
Theoretical Economics 9 (2), 409-434, 2014
602014
Stability and strategy-proofness for matching with constraints: A problem in the Japanese medical match and its solution
Y Kamada, F Kojima
American Economic Review 102 (3), 366-370, 2012
502012
Contracting with word-of-mouth management
Y Kamada, A Öry
Management Science 66 (11), 5094-5107, 2020
442020
Recent developments in matching with constraints
Y Kamada, F Kojima
American Economic Review 107 (5), 200-204, 2017
322017
Legislative committees as information intermediaries: a unified theory of committee selection and amendment rules
A Ambrus, EM Azevedo, Y Kamada, Y Takagi
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 94, 103-115, 2013
322013
Optimal timing of policy announcements in dynamic election campaigns
Y Kamada, T Sugaya
The Quarterly Journal of Economics 135 (3), 1725-1797, 2020
27*2020
Rationalizable partition‐confirmed equilibrium
D Fudenberg, Y Kamada
Theoretical Economics 10 (3), 775-806, 2015
252015
Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium with heterogeneous beliefs
D Fudenberg, Y Kamada
Games and Economic Behavior 109, 364-381, 2018
182018
Multi-agent search with deadline
Y Kamada, N Muto
mimeo, 2011
182011
Strongly Consistent Self‐Confirming Equilibrium
Y Kamada
Econometrica 78 (2), 823-832, 2010
152010
Improving efficiency in matching markets with regional caps: The case of the Japan residency matching program
Y Kamada, F Kojima
Unpublished paper.[329], 2011
122011
Asynchronous revision games with deadline: Unique equilibrium in coordination games
Y Kamada, T Sugaya
Unpublished paper.[413, 418, 421, 423, 424, 425], 2010
112010
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